Abstract. In this paper we extend the Weil descent attack due to Gaudry, Hess and Smart (GHS) to a much larger class of elliptic curves. This extended attack applies to fields of composite degree over F2. The principle behind the extended attack is to use isogenies to find an elliptic curve for which the GHS attack is effective. The discrete logarithm problem on the target curve can be transformed into a discrete logarithm problem on the isogenous curve. A further contribution of the paper is to give an improvement to an algorithm of Galbraith for constructing isogenies between elliptic curves, and this is of independent interest in elliptic curve cryptography. We show that a larger proportion than previously thought of elliptic curves over F 2 155 should be considered weak.
Introduction
The technique of Weil descent to solve the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) was first proposed by Frey [6] . This strategy was elaborated on further by Galbraith and Smart [9] . The work of Gaudry, Hess and Smart [10] gave a very efficient algorithm to reduce the ECDLP to the discrete logarithm in a Jacobian of a hyperelliptic curve over F q . Since subexponential algorithms exist for the discrete logarithm problem in high genus curves, this gives a possible method of attack against the ECDLP. We refer to the method of [10] as the GHS attack.
Menezes and Qu [15] analysed the GHS attack in some detail and demonstrated that it did not apply to the case when q = 2 and n is prime. Since this is the common case in real world applications, the work of Menezes and Qu means that the GHS attack does not apply to most deployed systems. However, there are a few deployed elliptic curve systems which use the fields F 2 155 and F 2 185 . Hence there is considerable interest as to whether the GHS attack makes all curves over these fields vulnerable. In [18] Smart examined the GHS attack for elliptic curves with respect to the field extension F 2 155 /F 2 31 and concluded that such a technique was unlikely to work for any curve defined over F 2 155 .
Jacobson, Menezes and Stein [11] also examined the field F 2 155 , this time using the GHS attack down to the subfield F 2 5 . They concluded that such a strategy could be used in practice to attack around 2 33 isomorphism classes of elliptic curves defined over F 2 155 . Since there are about 2 156 isomorphism classes of elliptic curves defined over F 2 155 , the probability of finding one where the GHS attack is applicable is negligible.
In this paper we extend the GHS attack to a much larger number of elliptic curves over certain composite fields of even characteristic.
The main principle behind the paper is the following. Let E 1 be an elliptic curve over a finite field F q n and suppose that the GHS attack transforms the discrete logarithm problem in E(F q n ) into one on a curve of genus g over F q . Now let E 2 be an elliptic curve over F q n which is isogenous to E 1 (i.e., #E 1 (F q n ) = #E 2 (F q n )). The GHS method is not usually invariant under isogeny, so the genus which arises from the GHS attack on E 2 can be different to the one for E 1 . There are two ways this property might be exploited:
-To solve a discrete logarithm problem on an elliptic curve E 1 over F q n for which the GHS attack is not effective, one could try to find an isogenous curve E 2 for which the GHS attack is effective. -It is often possible to construct a 'weak' elliptic curve E 2 over F q n for which the GHS attack is particularly successful (this is essentially what was done by [11] ). One might 'hide' such a curve by taking an isogeny to a curve E 1 for which the GHS attack is not effective. Knowledge of the 'trapdoor' (i.e., the isogeny) would enable one to solve the discrete logarithm. This approach might have both malicious and beneficial applications.
We achieve the first point as follows. Given an elliptic curve E 1 over F q n with N = #E 1 (F q n ) the strategy is to search over all elliptic curves which are vulnerable to the GHS attack (using the method of Section 4) until one is found which has N points (this is checked by 'exponentiating' a random point). Once such an 'easy' curve is found one can construct an isogeny explicitly using the method of Section 3, which is an improved version of the algorithm of Galbraith [8] .
This process extends the power of the GHS attack considerably. For instance, with K = F 2 155 and k = F 2 5 , Jacobson, Menezes and Stein [11] found that there are only 2 33 curves for which the GHS attack is feasible. Using our techniques the number of isomorphism classes of curves which are vulnerable to attack is increased to around 2
104 . This is a significant breakthrough in the power of the GHS attack.
Regarding the second point, we show that it is possible in principle to construct a trapdoor discrete logarithm problem using this approach. But such systems would not be practical.
As an aside, we note that the methods of this paper give a way to unify the treatment of subfield curves (sometimes called Koblitz curves) with the general case. Given an elliptic curve E 1 defined over F q then special techniques are required to perform Weil descent with respect to F q n /F q . By taking an isogeny φ : E 1 → E 2 such that E 2 is defined over F q n one can use the GHS method. However, we emphasise that subfield curves are only used when the extension degree n is a large prime, and Weil descent is not successful in this case.
We only describe the extended GHS strategy in the case of fields of characteristic two, though the principles can of course be easily adapted to the general case. We stress that, in the case of characteristic two, our results only apply to extension fields of composite degree.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we explain the GHS attack and the analysis of Menezes and Qu. In Section 3 we discuss the method of Galbraith for finding isogenies between elliptic curves, in addition we sketch a new version of Galbraith's algorithm which requires much less memory. In Section 4 we describe how to obtain an explicit list of isomorphism classes of elliptic curves for which the GHS attack can be successfully applied. In Section 5 we examine the implications of using isogenies to extend the GHS attack.
The GHS Attack
Let us first set up some notation. Throughout this paper we let E denote an elliptic curve over the field K = F q n where q = 2 r . Let k denote the subfield F q . To simplify the discussion, and since those cases are the most important, we always assume that r and n are odd. We also assume that n is a prime. We stress that it is easy to obtain analogous results in the more general case.
Define σ : K → K to be the q-power Frobenius automorphism, and let π : K → K denote the absolute Frobenius automorphism π : α → α 2 . Therefore, σ = π r . The elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) is the following: given P ∈ E(K) and Q ∈ P find an integer λ such that Q = [λ]P . The apparent intractability of the ECDLP forms the basis for the security of cryptographic schemes based on elliptic curves.
Let l denote the order of the point P . To avoid various well known attacks, namely those described in [16] , [17] , [14] and [7] , one chooses the curve such that l is a prime of size l ≈ q n . One also ensures that l does not divide q ni − 1, for all "small" values of i.
The GHS attack is as follows. One takes an elliptic curve defined, as above, over F q n , with a large subgroup of prime order l. We assume the curve is given by an equation of the form
We may assume that a ∈ {0, 1} since r and n are odd. Then one constructs the Weil restriction of scalars W E/k of E over k, this is an n-dimensional abelian variety over k. The variety W E/k is then intersected with n − 1 carefully chosen hyperplanes so as to obtain a hyperelliptic curve C over the field k. Let g denote the genus of C. In addition, the GHS attack gives an explicit and efficient group homomorphism from E(K) to the Jacobian J C (k) of the curve C. Assuming some mild conditions, J C (k) will contain a subgroup of order l and the image of the subgroup of order l in E(K) will be a non-trivial subgroup of order l in J C (k).
The genus of C is equal to either 2 m−1 or 2 m−1 − 1, where m is determined as follows.
Theorem 1 ([10]). Let
In particular we have 1 ≤ m ≤ n. If m is too small then the size of J C (k), which is ≈ q g , will be too small to contain a subgroup of size l. If m is too large then, although we can translate discrete logarithm problems to the hyperelliptic setting, this does not help us to solve the original ECDLP in practice.
Menezes and Qu proved the following theorem which characterises the smallest value of m > 1 and the elliptic curves which give rise to such m.
Theorem 2 ([15]).
Keeping the notation as above, and considering the GHS technique for Weil restriction of E from K down to k. Suppose n is an odd prime. Let t denote the multiplicative order of two modulo n and let s = (n − 1)/t. Then
For all 1 ≤ i ≤ s and all b ∈ B i the elliptic curves
where α is a fixed element of K of trace one with respect to K/F 2 (when r and n are odd we may take α = 1).
If m(b) = t + 1 then E must be one of the previous curves for some i and some b ∈ B i . 4. The cardinality of the set
B = ∪ s i=1 B i is qs(q t − 1) + q.
In particular, m(b) = t + 1 is the smallest attainable value of m(b) (apart from the trivial value m = 1) using the GHS technique for Weil restriction down to F q .
Menezes and Qu use the above theorem to show that if n is a prime in the range 160 ≤ n ≤ 600 and q = 2 then the GHS attack will be infeasible. If we consider smaller prime values of n we see that n = 31 is particularly interesting, since we obtain the particularly low value of t = 5 and s = 6. Thus for the field F 2 155 there are around 2 33 elliptic curves whose Weil restriction down to F 2 5 contains a hyperelliptic curve of genus 31 or 32. However, the next admissible size of t is 10, which would correspond to hyperelliptic curves of genus 2 11 or 2 11 − 1. The algorithms for solving the discrete logarithm problem on curves of genus 2 11 over F 2 5 do have subexponential complexity, but the problem has grown to such a size (10000 bits) that this is not an efficient way to solve a 155 bit elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem.
We also need to take into account the Weil restriction from F 2 155 down to F 2 31 . This will always lead to values of m equal to 1 or 5, thus the most useful hyperelliptic curves have genus 15 or 16. It was shown in [18] that solving a discrete logarithm problem on a curve of genus 16 over the field F 2 31 is infeasible using current technology.
It would therefore appear that, for the field F 2 155 , by avoiding the ≈ 2
33
curves which gives rise to t = 5 means one need not worry about the GHS attack. However, as we have explained in the introduction, our new results show that this argument is not true.
Constructing Isogenies
Let K = F q n be a finite field. Let Σ = σ n be the q n -th power Frobenius. Let E 1 and E 2 be two non-supersingular elliptic curves over K which are isogenous over K (i.e., #E 1 (K) = #E 2 (K)). We wish to find an explicit representation for an isogeny φ :
In [8] the following result was proved.
Theorem 3. There is an algorithm to compute φ which in the worst case takes
Galbraith in [8] gives the algorithm only in the case of prime fields of large characteristic. However, he also discusses how to extend the algorithm to arbitrary finite fields using the techniques of Couveignes [5] and Lercier [13] . It is clear that the complexity estimates are the same for the different types of finite fields. In this section we sketch a version of Galbraith's algorithm which has polynomial storage requirement. The technique to obtain an algorithm with reduced storage requirement is inspired by ideas of Pollard [17] . This new version has expected average case running time O(q n/4+ ). The sketched algorithm applies over any base field.
Let t denote the common trace of Frobenius of E 1 and E 2 . We have
we shall denote by O, and its class number by h ∆ . We have h ∆ < |∆| ln |∆| (see [4] Ex. 5.27). Since the Frobenius lies in End(
The algorithm for finding an isogeny φ : E 1 → E 2 consists of a number of stages.
Stage 0: Reduce to finding an isogeny between two curves whose endomorphism ring is the maximal order. Stage 1: Use a random walk to determine an ideal of O corresponding to an isogeny between the elliptic curves. Stage 2: Smooth the ideal (using ideas from index calculus algorithms for ideal class groups in quadratic fields).
Stage 3:
Extract an isogeny corresponding to the smooth ideal output by the previous stage.
In the next subsections we outline the various stages. We note that the main operations in Stages 1 and 2 can be parallelised.
In the course of our algorithm we will need to pass from isogenies to ideals and vice-versa. We shall now explain how to perform this subtask. The ideas in this section are based on subprocedures of the Schoof-Elkies-Atkin (SEA) algorithm. For an overview of this we refer to Chapter VII of [3] .
Let l be a prime. An l-isogeny between two elliptic curves E 1 and E 2 with endomorphism ring O corresponds to an O-ideal l of norm l. We shall concentrate on the more complicated case where l splits in O, leaving the ramified case to the reader.
Let j denote the j-invariant of an elliptic curve E over K such that End(E) ∼ = O. Let l denote a prime which splits in O (the maximal order). The characteristic polynomial of Frobenius factorises as
where µ, λ ∈ K. By Dedekind's Theorem the prime l splits in O into the product of the ideals
In addition, the modular polynomial Φ l (j, X) has two roots in K. These roots correspond to two j-invariants j 1 and j 2 , and these are the j-invariants of the elliptic curves E 1 and E 2 that are l-isogenous to E. We wish to determine the correct association between {j 1 , j 2 } and {l 1 , l 2 }. To do this we use techniques from the Elkies variant of Schoof's algorithm. Fix a j-invariant, say j 1 , and determine the subgroup C 1 of E[l] which lies in the kernel of the isogeny from E to E 1 . We then determine whether µ or λ is an eigenvalue for this isogeny by checking whether
If µ is an eigenvalue then j 1 corresponds to l 1 and j 2 corresponds to l 2 , otherwise the correspondence is the opposite.
Using the above techniques one can also solve the following inverse problem. Given j and a prime ideal l 1 , determine the j-invariant of the isogenous curve corresponding to the isogeny determined by l 1 .
In either direction the method requires operations on polynomials of degree O(l). Hence, the total complexity will be O((log q n )l 2 ) field operations, since the main bottleneck is computing x q n modulo the a polynomial in x of degree (l − 1)/2.
Stage 0:
Using Kohel's algorithm [12] we find, for each i, a chain of isogenies from E i to an elliptic curve E i whose endomorphism ring is the maximal order O. This is the part of the procedure which gives us the worst case running time. Let c be the largest integer such that c 2 |∆ and ∆/c 2 ≡ 0, 1 (mod 4). If c contains a large prime factor then this stage will not be efficient. This will lead to a large worst case complexity for our algorithm. However, on average c turns out to be both small and smooth, and so this stage is particularly simple. In fact if c = 1 (i.e., the order Z[Σ] is the maximal order) then Stage 0 can be eliminated completely.
By abuse of notation for the rest of the description we shall set E i = E i and j i = j(E i ).
Stage 1:
We define a random walk on the j-invariants of elliptic curves. More specifically, we will consider pairs of the form (j, a), where j is the j-invariant of some elliptic curve and a is an element of the ideal class group of O. The random walk only depends on the value of j.
The steps of the random walk will be l-isogenies for primes l in a set F of small primes. The set F must satisfy two important properties. First, the primes l corresponding to the primes l ∈ F should generate the ideal class group of O (otherwise it may not be possible to get a collision). Second, there should be enough primes in F that the walk "looks random". The set F is chosen as the set of primes which split in O (some ramified primes can also be used) which are less than some bound L. In theory we should take L = 6(log ∆) 2 . In practice, the set F can be taken to be rather small; it is usually enough that F contain about 16 distinct split primes.
We require a function
which should be deterministic but have a distribution close to uniform. The function f will be used to define the random walk. We usually construct this function using bits in the representation of the element of K.
Recall we have two j-invariants j 1 and j 2 of two isogenous elliptic curves and we wish to determine the isogeny between them, using as small amount of memory as possible. For this we use the ideas of Pollard.
We define a step of our random walk given a j-invariant j
k , X) to obtain one or two new jinvariants. Using the bit b select one of the j-invariants in a deterministic manner and call it j (i+1) k . Use the technique from earlier to determine the prime ideal l corresponding to the isogeny from j
A simplified presentation of the algorithm is as follows. We take a random walk of (1)). Eventually, after an expected T steps, we will find a value of S such that
If such a collision is not found then the initial j-invariants may be 'randomised', by taking known isogenies and computing the corresponding j-invariants.
In practice one uses a set of distinguished j-invariants and has many processors running in parallel (starting on differently randomised j-invariants).
Once a collision is found we know that the isogeny from j 1 to j 2 is represented by the ideal a = a
2 . It is possible to construct a chain of isogenies from E 1 to E 2 by following the paths in the random walk, but this is much longer than necessary. Instead, as we will show in the discussion of Stage 2 , one can obtain an isogeny which can be easily represented in a short and compact format.
To analyse the complexity of Stage 1 we notice that since the random walk is on a set of size h ∆ then we expect a collision to occur after πh ∆ /2 steps, by the birthday paradox. In the unlikely event that a collision does not occur after this many steps, we start again with related initial j-invariants, or repeat the process using a different function f . Since each step of the walk requires at most O((log q n )L 2 ) field operations we obtain a final complexity for Stage 1 of
Stage 2:
Now we have two j-invariants j 1 and j 2 and an ideal a representing an isogeny between j 1 and j 2 . We can assume that a is a reduced ideal. In this stage we will replace a by a smooth ideal. Of course, the ideal a was originally constructed as a smooth product of ideals, but this representation has enormous (exponential) length. Hence we desire a representation which is more suitable for computation. This is accomplished using techniques from index calculus algorithms for imaginary quadratic fields.
We choose a factor base F as a set of prime ideals of O which are split or ramified in O and of size less than some bound L , which should be chosen to optimise the performance (which depends on smoothness probabilities).
We repeatedly compute the following reduced (this can be distributed) ideal 
The size of the b i 's are bounded since the ideal b is reduced. We choose L (see below) so that we heuristically expect to require at most q n/4 choices of the a i before we obtain a value of b which is sufficiently smooth. Hence, if we assume |a i | ≤ t then we will require
In other words the value of t can be taken to be of polynomial size in n log(q). Hence, we require polynomial storage to hold the isogeny as a smooth ideal.
To estimate the running time we need to examine the probability of obtaining a smooth number. We are essentially testing whether an integer of size √ ∆, i.e. the norm of a reduced ideal, factors over a factor base of integers less than L . There is an optimal choice for L , but to obtain our result it is enough to take L = (log(q n )) 2 . Standard estimates give an asymptotic smoothness probability of approximately u −u where u = log(∆)/ log(L). In our case the probability is
for some constant c. Therefore the complexity of Stage 2 is q n/4+ . For real life applications (since we need to use the modular polynomials of degree less than L ) we actually select L = 1000. The probability is of finding a factorisation of this form is Ψ (x, 1000)/x where Ψ (N, b) is the number of bsmooth integers less than N .
For completeness we give the following table on approximate values of
for values of x of interest in our situation. These values have been computed by Dan Bernstein [2] . 
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−45
For the typical case, we must factor an integer of size 2 80 over a factor base of primes less than 1000. From the table we find the probability of success is 2 −24 , which gives a total complexity less than q n/4 = 2 160/4 = 2 40 . Similarly, from the table we see that for all values of n in the range 100 ≤ n ≤ 240, Stage 2 of our algorithm will run in time O(q n/4+ ).
Stage 3:
Finally we can write down the isogeny between E 1 and E 2 . This is done by taking each prime ideal in equation (1) and applying the method previously given to determine the associated j-invariant. We comment that negative powers of a prime l correspond to positive powers of the complex conjugate ideal l. The actual isogeny is determined by Vélu's formulae [19] .
Chaining these isogenies together we obtain the desired map from E 1 to E 2 . In practice we do not actually write down the isogeny but simply evaluate the isogeny on the points of interest.
The ideal b in Stage 2 will have norm at most O( √ ∆). The smooth representation of the ideal equivalent to a will have at most O(log ∆) not necessarily distinct factors in it, each factor corresponding to an isogeny of degree at most L. Hence, the mapping of points from E 1 to E 2 , given the smooth representation of the ideal equivalent to a, can be performed in time polynomial in log q n .
Finding Vulnerable Curves
Theorem 2 shows that there is a set of possible values for b such that the elliptic curves
have a specific small value for m. For our application it is necessary to be able to generate at least one representative for each isogeny class of elliptic curves with this small m. In this section we discuss methods to achieve this.
Note that another approach would be to list all members of the given isogeny class, but this almost always requires more than O(q n/2 ) operations. By Theorem 2, the set of possible values b is equal to the union of the sets
An element b lies in two of these sets if there are indices i and j such that
Each of these sets will be handled in turn, so from now on we fix an index i and define f (x) = (x − 1)f i (x) and B = {b ∈ F q n : f (σ)b = 0}.
Let α be a normal basis generator for K = F 2 rn over F 2 . In other words {α, α 2 , . . . , α 2 nr−1 } is a vector space basis for K over F 2 . It is a fundamental fact that such an element α exists and that
The following result is an easy exercise.
Lemma 1. Let the notation be as above. Write h(x)
Indeed, in the above it is enough to let the g(x) run over a set of representatives for the quotient ring F q [x]/(f (x)) (i.e., over all elements of F q [x] of degree less than deg(f (x))).
Lemma 1 gives an efficient algorithm to compute representatives for each set B which has running time O(#B). Clearly #B = q deg(f (x)) . By taking the union of these sets we obtain all the values for b which we require. In the notation of Theorem 2 we have s values for i and deg(f i (x)) = t, therefore #B i = q t+1 for each index i and, since the intersection of any two B i has size q it follows that #(∪ i B i ) = qs(q t − 1) + q as claimed in Theorem 2. In the appendix we describe a more efficient search strategy to find whether there are any isogenous curves with a small value of m. The refined method is designed to give at least one representative for each isogeny class. The full list of candidates has size sq t+1 /(nr) and the complexity of generating this list is O(sq t+1 /(nr)) operations in K.
Implications
We stress that for curves over large prime fields the techniques of Weil restriction do not apply, and for curves over fields of the form F 2 p , where p is prime, Menezes and Qu [15] showed that for curves of cryptographic interest the GHS attack does not apply. Hence, for the rest of this section we will concentrate on the case where K = F q n where q = 2 r is a non-trivial power of two and n is a prime such that 5 ≤ n < 43.
Theorem 2 states that an upper bound on the number of isomorphism classes with the smallest non-trivial value of m is given roughly by 2sq t+1 . Hence the probability that a random curve is vulnerable to the GHS attack is roughly sq t+1−n . We now consider the number of isogeny classes which contain a curve with the smallest non-trivial value of m. The total number of isogeny classes of curves is around 2q n/2 , due to the Hasse-Weil bounds and the fact that we are in characteristic two. We make the heuristic assumption that the elliptic curves with small m distribute over the isogeny classes similar to arbitrary elliptic curves. Note that the 2-power Frobenius preserves the value of m. We make the heuristic assumption that this is the only isogeny with this property. Hence, the number of non-isomorphic curves with the smallest non-trivial value of m (up to 2-power Frobenius action) is 2sq t+1 nr .
Thus we deduce that the probability that a random elliptic curve over K lies in an isogeny class which contains a curve with the smallest non-trivial value of m is approximated by p = min(1, p) where
nr .
We now consider some special cases of small prime n. Recall that st = n − 1. For the cases with s = 1 the GHS attack does not reduce the problem to one which is significantly easier. Our extension is not interesting in that case.
When s = 2 we obtain an interesting case. The original GHS method applies to a random curve with probability about 2/q (n−1)/2 in this case. The extended approach should apply with probability about 2q 1/2 /(nr) which is larger than one when n is fixed and q → ∞. In other words, we should eventually be able to consider all curves using the new method.
However, our method is not feasible in this case since the (reduced) set B of Theorem 2 and the end of section 4 has size 2q (n+1)/2 /(nr) and so the cost of finding all the curves with small m is greater than the Pollard methods for solving the original ECDLP.
The only prime value of n with s ≥ 3 in the range 5 ≤ n < 43 is n = 31 where s = 6 and t = 5. This is particularly interesting given that the field F 2 155 is used for an elliptic curve group in the IPSEC set of protocols for key agreement. See [1] for a description of the curve used and [18] for a previous analysis of this curve using the GHS attack with n = 5.
When n = 31 the proportion of all curves which succumb to the basic GHS attack is approximately 6q −25 . For the extended attack, assuming the values of m are distributed evenly over the isogeny classes, the proportion of all vulnerable curves is approximately 6q −9.5 31r .
The complexity of the extended method is as follows. Given an elliptic curve E with N points we search all the curves which have small m (using the method of the Appendix) until we find one with N points (this is checked by exponentiating a random point). This search takes less than 6q 6 /(31r) steps. If such a curve is found then construct an isogeny using Section 3 in O(q 7.75+ ) operations in most cases. For r = 5 we obtain a total of about O(2 26 + 2 39 ) operations. Jacobson, Menezes and Stein [11] stated that solving the discrete logarithm problem on the hyperelliptic curve is feasible for curves of cryptographic interest when m = t + 1 = 6 and r = 5. The total complexity is expected to be dominated by O(2 39 ), which is quite feasible. For the IPSEC curve over F 2 155 this means there is roughly a 2 −52 chance that the curve can be attacked using the extended GHS attack, as opposed to 2 −122 for the standard GHS attack. Using the methods in Section 4 we searched all isogeny classes to see if there was a curve with m = 6 which was isogenous to the IPSEC curve. This search took 31 days on a 500 Mhz Pentium III using the Magma package. Not surprisingly we did not find an isogenous curve and so we can conclude that the IPSEC curve is not susceptible to the extended GHS attack. This shows that further research into Weil descent is required before it can be shown that all elliptic curves over composite extension fields are weak.
We comment that for most small primes n ≥ 43 with s ≥ 3 the value of t is so large that the GHS method is not effective, except for the well-known case of n = 127 which has t = 7 (the next smallest values are n = 73 with t = 9 and n = 89 with t = 11). If we consider elliptic curves over F q 127 then the extended GHS method applies with probability roughly 18q −55.5 /(127r) compared with probability 18q
−119 for the usual GHS attack. We briefly mention one possible extension of the ideas of this paper. Given an ECDLP in E(F q n ) one could enlarge the field to F q nl for a small value of l. One could then perform the GHS attack with respect to the extension F q nl /F q and the number of curves with small m might be increased. The drawback of this approach is that the final discrete logarithm problem which must be solved has grown in size. We expect that this approach would not be useful in practice.
Finally we comment on the possibility of using Weil descent and isogenies to construct a trapdoor for the ECDLP. Suppose E/F q n is vulnerable to the GHS attack and suppose one has an isogeny φ : E → E such that E is not vulnerable to the GHS attack. Then one could publish E and yet solve the ECDLP using the trapdoor φ.
The methods of this paper allow an attacker to find φ whenever the (reduced) set B of Theorem 2 is small enough. Since B has size sq t+1 /(nr) it follows that t should be large for the trapdoor discrete logarithm scheme. On the other hand, to solve the DLP using the GHS attack it is necessary that t be small.
The most suitable case seems to be n = 7. The set B has size O(q 4 ) while the GHS attack reduces to a DLP on a genus 8 curve (and Gaudry's algorithm requires O(q 2+ ) operations). However, these parameters do not appear to result in a truly practical system. both odd then gcd(x rn − 1, rnx rn−1 ) = 1). The Chinese remainder theorem for polynomials implies that we have the following isomorphism of F 2 [x]-modules
The terms on the right hand side are finite fields K j = F 2 [x]/(f j (x)). Combining Lemma 2 and equation (4) we see that the F 2 [π]-module B is isomorphic to the F 2 [x]-module (⊕ j K j ). We need to understand the action of π on elements of B, and this corresponds to multiplication of elements of (⊕ j K j ) by x.
Hence, write N j for the normal subgroup of K * j generated by x, so that x(gN j ) = gN j for any g ∈ K * j . It follows that the cosets of K * j /N j give representatives for the x-orbits of elements of K * j (the zero element of K j must be handled separately). We write c j = [K * j : N j ] for the index (i.e., the number of distinct cosets). Let ζ j be a generator for the cyclic group K * j , then N j = ζ cj j (i.e., x = ζ dcj j for some d which depends on ζ j ). However, it is not possible to study the fields K j individually. Instead, we have to consider the product ⊕ j K j and have to consider that the action of x on this product is multiplication by x on every coordinate.
The following result gives an explicit set of representatives for (⊕ j K j )/ x . This is essentially achieved by forming a diagonalisation (under the action of x) of the set ⊕ j K j .
Lemma 3. The set
is a set of representatives for (⊕ j K j )/ x . Proof. The result follows from two facts. First, every element of ⊕ j K j is of the given form if we disregard the condition 0 ≤ b < c a . Second, x acts as This set of representatives can be easily mapped to B as follows. For any g 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ g l we can represent each g j ∈ K j = F 2 [x]/(f j (x)) as a polynomial g j (x) ∈ F 2 [x]. The Chinese remainder algorithm gives g(x) ∈ F 2 [x]/(f (x)) which reduces to each g j (x) modulo (f j (x)). We then obtain the corresponding value b = g(π)α ∈ B.
Thus we obtain an algorithm to compute a set B of elements whose π-orbits generate B.
